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Merrill Lynch v. Dabit: The Case of the Scorned
Broker and the Death of the State Securities Fraud
Class Action Suit'

I. INTRODUCTION

In a news conference on Tuesday, April 8, 2002, New York
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer announced that his office had been
conducting a nine month investigation into an investment analysis
conducted by Merrill Lynch analysts. 2 Spitzer alleged that Merrill
Lynch analysts had produced misleadingly positive assessments of
stocks so that the investment banking arm of Merrill Lynch could
secure fees from selling stock and advising on mergers. The New
York Attorney General pointed to Merrill Lynch email messages
that referred to the same stocks subject to rosy assessments as
"piece[s] of junk" and "powder keg[s] as evidence to support his
accusations." 3 At the time of the announcement, Wall Street
observers hinted that conflicts of interest and biased
recommendations permeated the entire industry.4
Indeed,
approximately one month later Spitzer announced that he had
expanded the scope of his investigation to include Switzerland's
UBS AG and Credit Suisse Group. 5 Merrill Lynch quickly
negotiated a $100 million settlement with Spitzer that outlined a
series of reforms designed to eliminate the alleged conflicts of
interest. 6 Other Wall Street investment banks mimicked the
Copyright 2006, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. "MerrillLynch, Pierce,Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit 'is the death knell
for state securities litigation, period, full stop."' Rachel McTague, Dabit Ruling
Seen as 'Death Knell' For State Securities Class Actions, SECURITIES
REGULATION
&
LAW
REPORT,
Apr.
24,
2006,
available at
http://corplawcenter.bna.com/pic2/clb.nsf/id/BNAP-6P3T5P?OpenDocument.
2. Tom Incantalupo, Spitzer: NY to Probe Other Securities Firms,
NEWSDAY, Apr. 9, 2002, at A45.
3. Id. These emails allegedly were written by the infamous Merrill Lynch
security analyst Henry Blodget. Michael Gormley, Merrill Talks to Get More
Time, GLOBE & MAIL, May 8, 2002, at B13.
4. Incantalupo, supra note 2.
5. Gormley, supra note 3.

6. Id.
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reforms outlined in the settlement, including Credit Suisse First
Boston.
The damage, however, was already done. Shadi Dabit, a
former Merrill Lynch broker, filed a class action suit against his
former employer alleging breach of fiduciary duty and the
covenant of fair dealing on behalf of current and former Merrill
Lynch brokers. 7 Dabit pointed to Merrill Lynch's misleading
analyst reports as the cause for his and his clients' decision to hold
their securities beyond the point when they would have sold had
they known the truth. 8 Rather than relying on federal securities
law, Dabit anchored his claim on Oklahoma state law which,
according to Dabit's interpretation, recognized a securities fraud
holding claim.
Dabit's choice was shrewd given the changing legal landscape
of private securities fraud class action suits. Compared to state
regulation, federal securities law imposes strict jurisprudential
standing requirements and heightened pleading standards. 9
Conversely, state securities regulation is less stringent given that
some states recognize securities fraud holding claims,' 0 which are
grounded in tort theories of fraudulent inducement. 11
Nevertheless, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1998 ("SLUSA") stands as a formidable obstacle to the viability of
state securities fraud claims. If a court determines that the
plaintiffs' state law holding claim falls within SLUSA's
7. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503,
1507 (2006).
8. Id.
9. See discussion infra Parts II.A-B.
10. Securities fraud holding claims are made by shareholders who allege
that they were induced not to sell their securities. See infra notes 35-40 and
accompanying text for a discussion of these state claims. By their very
definition, such claims do not satisfy standing requirements established with
regard to a private right of action inferred under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
See infra notes 16-34 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the
federal securities laws and Section 10(b).
11. This idea is synonymous with "fraud in the inducement" or "fraud
occurring when a misrepresentation leads another to enter into a transaction with
a false impression of the risks, duties, or obligations involved." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 686 (8th ed. 2004). See infra Part II.B for a discussion of this tort
theory and its relationship with state securities laws.
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preemptive scope, the statute functions to invalidate the plaintiffs'
state law claim. 12 Once the action is removed to federal court, the
plaintiffs' cause of action is dismissed altogether since federal
securities law does not recognize analogous holding claims. Prior
to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Dabit, a split had
emerged among the federal courts of appeals regarding whether
SLUSA's preemptive scope reached class action suits premised on
state securities fraud holding claims. The Supreme Court resolved
this conflict among the federal appellate circuits in March of 2006
when it held that SLUSA preempts state securities fraud holding
claims. 13
In a time where forty-one percent of investors identify
"dishonesty" as the main issue facing the securities industry 14 and
defrauded shareholders may expect to receive only around six
percent of their claimed losses against even solvent companies," it
is an appropriate moment to reevaluate the regulatory state of the
securities markets and explore legal methods to restore investor
confidence. This casenote addresses the extent to which state law
holding claims fall within SLUSA's preemptive scope. Part II
examines the background of the federal securities law, Congress's
recent efforts to amend the original SEC Act, and the specific
provisions in SLUSA. Part III of this casenote considers federal
circuit decisions concerning SLUSA preemption of state law
holding claims and identifies the majority and minority rules that
have resulted from a split among the circuits. Finally, Part IV
addresses the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Merrill
Lynch v. Dabit, which recognized that SLUSA's preemptive scope
reaches securities fraud holding claim class action suits.
Furthermore, Part IV also examines some remaining questions
surrounding SLUSA, including whether the statute should be
construed as a statute of complete preemption and whether the

12. See discussion infra Part II.C.3.
13. MerrillLynch, 126 S. Ct. 1503.
14. Gary Weiss, Revenge of the Investor: Angry Shareholders Are
Investigating Brokerage Fraud, Waging Proxy Fights, and Agitating for
Securities Reform, Bus. WK., Dec. 16, 2002, at 116.
15. Dan Carney, Why the Little Guy Can't Win, BUS. WK., Oct. 14, 2002, at
132.
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Court's interpretation of SLUSA has any collateral impact on the
SEC's enforcement authority.
II.

FEDERAL AND STATE SECURITIES LAWS AND CONGRESS'S

BLURRING OF THE LINES

To appreciate the magnitude of Congress's action in passing
SLUSA in 1998, it is important to understand the relationship
between the federal and state regimes prior to 1998. Congress
intended to supplement and reinforce state securities laws when it
first enacted the 1933 and 1934 Acts. However, after recent
federal legislative steps, federal and state securities laws have
existed in an increasingly precarious dichotomy. This Part
discusses the background regarding SLUSA preemption of state
securities fraud holding claims by examining the federal securities
laws and the implicit private right of action under Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5, the various common law theories that have been
used in state courts for securities fraud, and Congress's most recent
legislative steps to shift the balance between federal and state
securities fraud causes of action.
A. FederalSecurities Laws and Section I 0(b)
Although the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 does not
explicitly provide a private right of action for securities fraud,
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act has been judicially interpreted to
provide such a private right of action. 16 The language of Section
10(b) provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person.., to use
or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
. . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe."' 17 A private right of action under Section 10(b)
was judicially inferred as early as 1946.18 Given its unique
16. Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6,
13 n.9 (1971).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000) (emphasis added). The corresponding section
in the Code of Federal Regulations also repeats the "in connection with the
purchase or sale" language. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951) ("Rule lOb-5").
18. Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
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jurisprudential origin, the private right of action under Section
10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act has been appropriately
described
as a "judicial oak that has grown from a legislative
19
acorn."

Because a private right of action under the 1934 Act has been
judicially inferred, the United States Supreme Court has taken
steps to restrict the use of Section 10(b) as a private remedy. The
Court adopted the purchaser/seller standing rule in its decision in
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores as a means of restricting
the circumstances in which plaintiffs could use Section 10(b) as a
private cause of action. 20 The plaintiff in Blue Chip Stamps
alleged that he and the other members of the class failed to
purchase shares issued by Blue Chip Stamp Co. as part of a
reorganization plan due to their reliance on a false and misleading
prospectus.2' Before the Court reached its final disposition of the
case, it recited the history of the standing rule.
The
purchaser/seller standing rule was born of a Second Circuit opinion
written by Judge Augustus Hand that reasoned since both Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 addressed fraud "in connection with the
purchase or sale" of covered securities, the plaintiff class in a Rule
10b-5 private action was limited to actual purchasers and sellers.22
In adopting the purchaser/seller standing rule, the Court found that
such a limitation on the plaintiff class would avoid the use of
Section 10(b) as a private tool for vexatious or strike suits23 and
would thus promote judicial economy. 24 The Court, however, was
careful to explicitly state that the purchaser/seller standing
requirement in regard to private rights of action was not required
19. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
20. Id. at 749.
21. Id. at 727.
22. Id. at 730-31 (citing Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp. 193 F.2d 461,
463-64 (2d Cir. 1952)).
23. Id. at 739-40. A strike suit is defined as "a suit, often based on no valid
claim, brought either for nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or
inflated settlement." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1475 (8th ed. 2004).
24. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 742-43. Regarding judicial economy,
the Court reasoned that a plaintiff's failure to satisfy the standing requirement
would be easy to determine since the fact of a purchase or sale of a stock is
easily verified by documentation and does not depend on oral testimony. Id. at
742.

232

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 67

by the language of Section 10(b) 25 and that the standing
requirement in no way affected the enforcement authority of the
SEC under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 26 The Court did note
that the adoption of the standing rule would deprive otherwise
deserving plaintiffs of a federal cause of action,27 but stated in a
footnote that the same plaintiffs were free to pursue applicable
2
remedies for nonpurchasers and nonsellers under state law.
More recently, the Court has addressed the required nexus
between the purchase or sale of a security and the fraudulent act in
its decision in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Zandford.29
Zandford involved a securities broker who was convicted of
misappropriating the proceeds of stock sales from an investment
account of his clients. 30 The SEC filed a civil action against
Zandford for violation of Section 10(b) after his criminal
conviction. 31 The Court addressed the issue of whether Zandford's
alleged fraudulent conduct was sufficiently in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security. 32 The Court held that Zandford's
actions satisfied the "in connection with" requirement of Section
10(b) since his fraudulent action and the purchase or sale of the
security were interdependent. 33 Therefore, the Court established
25. Id. at 737 ("Having said all this, we would by no means be understood
as suggesting that we are able to divine from the language of Section 10(b) the
express 'intent of Congress' as to the contours of a private cause of action under
Rule 1Ob-5 .... Such growth may be quite consistent with the Congressional
enactment and with the role of the federal judiciary in interpreting it, but it
would be disingenuous to suggest that either Congress in 1934 or the Securities
and Exchange Commission in 1942 foreordained the present state of the law

with respect to Rule lOb-5.").
26. Id. at 752 n. 14 (noting that prior jurisprudence has established that the
purchaser/seller standing requirement is no limitation on the standing of the SEC
to bring actions for injunctive relief under Section 10(b) and Rule IOb-5).
27. Id. at 738.
28. Id. at 739 n.9.
29. 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
30. Id. at 815-16.
31. Id. at 816.
32. Id. at 815.
33. Id. at 820 ("The securities sales and respondent's fraudulent practices
were not independent events. This is not a case in which, after a lawful
transaction had been consummated, a broker decided to steal the proceeds and
did so. Nor is it a case in which a thief simply invested the proceeds of a routine
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that the nexus required between the fraudulent action and the
purchase or sale of a security is one of interdependence and found
that Section 10(b)'s broad scope, in terms of the phrase "in
misrepresentations regarding
connection with," extended beyond
34
the value of a particular security.
B. State SecuritiesLaws and Common Law Causes ofAction
Shareholders have employed multiple causes of action for
securities fraud under state common law theories long before the
passage of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act. Included in
these remedies is a theory of recovery for the loss a shareholder
suffers when that shareholder is induced not to sell a security.
Such common law theories generally fall under the category of
either fraud or negligent misrepresentation. 35 In addition to these
general remedies, some states, including California, also recognize
a cause of action for securities fraud under a theory of induced
forbearance. 36 Other states that recognize a similar cause of action
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Hampshire,
include New York,
37
Wisconsin.
and
A common law cause of action for induced forbearance
regarding the holding of a security is rooted in tort law. The
Second Restatement of Torts provides that:
[O]ne who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact,
opinion, intention or law for the purpose of inducing
another to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it,
is subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary

conversion in the stock market. Rather, respondent'sfraud coincided with the
sale themselves.") (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 820.
35. Joshua D. Ratner, Stockholders' Holding Claim Class Actions Under
State Law After the Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 1035,

1037 (2001).
36. Greenfield v. Fritz Co., 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530, 540 (Cal. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2000), rev'd on other grounds sub nom, Small v. Fritz Co., 65 P.3d 1255
(Cal. 2003).
37. Id. at 538.
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loss caused to him
by his justifiable reliance upon the
38
misrepresentation.
The legal concept of forbearance establishes that if an individual
has a right to do something, including the right to sell a share of
stock, then the refusal to exercise that right has power and legal
significance. 39 The California court in Greenfield recognized the
following as required elements for a common law claim of induced
forbearance: (1) the corporate issuer of the shares must have made
a representation; (2) the misrepresentation must have concerned a
matter of fact, not opinion; (3) the misrepresentation must have
been material to the shareholder's decision not to sell; (4) the
misrepresentation must have been received by the shareholder; (5)
the shareholder must have relied on the misrepresentation; (6) the
shareholder's reliance must have been justified; and (7) the
misrepresentation 40must have been the proximate cause of damage
to the shareholder.
C. CongressionalShifts in the Balance
Between the years of 1934 and 1995, Congress did little to alter
the balance between these alternative regimes of securities fraud
laws. However, Congress's passage of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), the National Securities
Market Improvement Act of 1996 ("NSMIA"), and SLUSA in
1998 has profoundly altered the balance.
1. The PSLRA of 1995
The PSLRA 4 1 was passed by Congress to remedy perceived
abuses by plaintiff classes of private Section 10(b) actions. It is
comprised primarily of procedural reforms designed to make it

38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
39. Greenfield, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 539.
40. Id. at 543. After listing the above seven factors, the California court
retorted, "[I]n no way is this a slam-dunk windfall for plaintiffs." Id.
41. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1

(2005).
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more difficult to bring federal private securities fraud actions.42
Included within these procedural reforms are heightened pleading
requirements 43 and an automatic stay of discovery upon the filing
of a motion to dismiss.44 Although, after enacting the PSLRA,
Congress was satisfied that it had put into place adequate
procedural reforms to discourage abusive private use of Section
10(b), it soon became apparent that plaintiff classes could evade
the statute's rigorous requirements by bringing an action for
securities fraud in state courts.45 Congress was thereby convinced
that it needed to take legislative steps to close the loophole
inadvertently created by the PSLRA.
2. The NSMIA of 1996
A significant interim legislative step between the PSLRA and
SLUSA was made by Congress through the passage of the
NSMIA.4 6 Congress enacted the NSMIA to Rromote efficiency
and capital formation in the financial markets.
Specifically, the
NSMIA preempted state registration of nationally traded
securities. 8 The NSMIA defined a covered security as a security
that is:
(1) Listed, or authorized for listing, on the New York Stock
Exchange or the American Stock Exchange, or listed, or
authorized for listing, on the National Market System of the
NASDAQ Stock Market (or any successor to such entities);
(2) Listed, or authorized for listing, on a national securities
exchange (or tier or segment thereof) that has listing
42. Jennifer O'Hare, Preemption Under the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act: If It Looks Like a Securities Fraud Claim and Acts Like a
Securities Fraud Claim, Is It a Securities FraudClaim?, 56 ALA. L. REv. 325,
335 (2004).

43. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-l(a)(2)(A) (2005).
44. Id.§ 77z-l(b).
45. O'Hare, supra note 42, at 337.
46. National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2005)).
47. Id.

48.

15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)(1) (2005).
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standards that the Commission determines by rule (on its
own initiative or on the basis of a petition) are substantially
similar to the listing standards applicable to securities
described in subparagraph (A); or
(3) Is a security of the same issuer that is equal in seniority
or that is a senior security to a security described in
subparagraph (A) or (B). 49
The NSMIA marked a decisive Congressional step to set aside
the duality between state and federal registration that had marked
securities law since the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933.50
As such, the NSMIA represented an early indication of
Congressional policy favoring uniform national regulation and
standards imposed on nationally-traded securities, policy which
would come to fruition in 1998. However, by its terms, the
NSMIA did not affect state anti-fraud remedies or the viability of
state defrauded holder claims.
3. SLUSA of 1998
Out of the background of the PSLRA and the NSMIA,
SLUSA 5 1 was enacted by Congress to stop the federal flight of
securities fraud class actions into state court. In its statement of
findings preceding the text of SLUSA, Congress acknowledged
that the flight of federal securities fraud class actions had frustrated
the purposes of the PSLRA.52 Furthermore, Congress claimed that
it was appropriate to create uniform standards for nationally-traded
securities "while preserving appropriate enforcement power of
State securities regulators" in order to prevent state securities law

49. Id. § 77r(b)(1).
50. See Kevin A. Jones, The National Securities Markets Improvement Act
of 1996: A New Model for Efficient Capital Formation, 53 ARK. L. REv. 153
(2000) (discussing the details of the NSMIA and its impact on the duality
between state and federal securities regulation).
51. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2005)).
52. Id. § 2 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a (2005)).
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from being used to evade the stricter requirements of the PSLRA.53
The substance of SLUSA's preemption provision states that:
No covered class action based upon the statutory or
common law of any State or subdivision thereof may be
maintained in any State or Federal court by any private
party alleging(A) an untrue statement or omission of a material fact in
connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security;
or
(B) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in54connection with the
purchase or sale of a covered security.
SLUSA includes a companion removal provision that
corresponds to the preemption provision. This portion of the
statute states:
Any covered class
involving a covered
shall be removable
district in which the
to subsection (b).55

action brought in any State court
security, as set forth in subsection (b),
to the Federal district court for the
action is pending, and shall be subject

Borrowing from the language of the NSMIA, the statute
provides the definition of a covered security 56 as well as a covered
class action. 57 However, SLUSA expressly excludes shareholder
derivative actions from the Act's preemptive scope. 58 The statute
also excludes a group of state class actions, the so-called
"Delaware Carve-Outs." 59 The carve-outs were excluded to
53.

Id.

54. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2005).
55. Id. § 77p(c).
56. Id. § 77p(f)(3) ("The term 'covered security' means a security that
satisfies the standards for a covered security specified in paragraph (1) or (2) of
section 77r(b) of this title .... "). See id. §§ 77r(b)(1) and (2) (defining a
covered security using criteria based on the security's listing with the New York
Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, the Nasdaq or any successor to
such entities).
57. Id. § 77p(f)(2).
58. Id. § 77p(f)(2)(B).

59. Id. § 77p(d)(1).
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preserve state court class actions for breach of the fiduciary duty of
disclosure, a duty imposed on corporate officers 60and directors by
the law of the corporation's state of incorporation.
Courts have digested the multiple provisions within SLUSA
into a four-part test used to determine whether the preemption
provision applies to a specific action. The test provides that
SLUSA's preemption provision applies when the following
conditions have been satisfied: (1) the action is a covered class
action; (2) the action purports to be based on state law; (3) the
defendant has been alleged to have misrepresented or omitted a
material fact, or to have used or employed any manipulative device
or contrivance; and (4) the defendant has been alleged to have
engaged in fraudulent conduct in connection with the purchase or
sale of a covered security.6'
III. THE SCORNED BROKER: THE DABIT CASE AND THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT SPLIT

Despite a consensus among the federal courts of appeals on the
required elements of SLUSA preemption, there was not complete
agreement among the federal circuit courts regarding the
applicability of SLUSA preemption to state securities fraud class
action claims brought by defrauded holders of securities. Since
such class action suits are characterized by a plaintiff class
comprised of defrauded shareholders who have not sold their
stock, these claims do not satisfy the Blue Chip Stamps
purchaser/seller standing rule by their own definition. This portion
of the casenote addresses the position taken by the Second Circuit
on the issue and the growing divergence among the federal courts
of appeals. The Second Circuit joined a substantial majority of the
courts of appeals who had ruled in favor of excluding state

60. Gary M. Berne & Mark A. Friel, Common Law and State Law Claims:
What's Left After SLUSA, 1309 PLI/CORP 107 (2002).
61. Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d 25, 33
(2d Cir. 2005), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 1503 (2006); Green v. Ameritrade, Inc., 279
F.3d 590, 596 (8th Cir. 2002); Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 292 F.3d 1334, 1342 (1 lth Cir. 2002).
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62
securities law holding claims from SLUSA's preemptive scope.
Only one circuit ruled against the exclusion of state holding claims
and found that SLUSA is a statute of complete preemption, a
conclusion with considerable jurisdictional implications.

A. The Dabit Case
Former Merrill Lynch broker Shadi Dabit brought suit against
his employer on behalf of himself and other current and former
Merrill Lynch brokers in April of 2002 in the Western District of
Oklahoma. The suit was filed after New York Attorney General
Eliot Spitzer announced a pending investigation into conflicts of
interest at large investment firms, including the defendant
brokerage firm . 63 Dabit alleged that, during the period of
December 1, 1999, to December 31, 2000, the members of the
putative class had purchased and refrained from selling Merrill
Lynch-recommended securities upon the advice of Merrill Lynch's
analysts. The complaint also alleged that the putative plaintiffs
had lost clients as a result of the purchases of the recommended
stocks and Merrill Lynch's alleged misconduct. 64 Attached to the
complaint was a list of stocks purchased by Dabit and
recommended to his lost customers during the class period and a
report prepared by the Office of the Attorney General of New York
describing Merrill Lynch's scheme to promote its investment
banking business by recommending certain stocks and causing
their prices to inflate. Dabit sought relief for Merrill Lynch's
of good faith and
alleged breach of fiduciary duty and the covenant
65
law.
Oklahoma
under
presumably
fair dealing,
The Western District of Oklahoma dismissed Dabit's first
complaint in October of 2002 as preempted by SLUSA, but gave
him the opportunity to re-plead since it acknowledged that
Oklahoma law conceivably recognized such holding claims.66
62. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 403 F.3d 478 (7th Cir. 2005), vacated
on other grounds, 126 S. Ct. 2145 (2006).
63. Dabit, 395 F.3d at 27-28.
64. Id. at 29.
65. Id. Dabit filed the action in the Western District of Oklahoma alleging
jurisdiction on diversity grounds.
66. Id.
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*Dabit amended his petition merely to replace references to
purchases of securities with references to the holding of securities,
defining the putative class to include "brokers who owned and
continued to own one or more of the [Merrill Lynch]
recommended securities . ..or recommended such securities to
their clients during the period of December 1, 1999 through
December 31, 2000. ,67
As before, the amended complaint
requested damages for Merrill Lynch's breach of fiduciary duty
and covenant of good faith and fair dealing and attached the list of
Merrill Lynch-recommended securities and the report of the New
York Attorney General as exhibits. However, before the Western
District of Oklahoma could determine whether the amended
complaint also was preempted by SLUSA, Dabit's complaint was
combined with more than 120 other cases against Merrill Lynch in
the Southern District of New York by the Judicial Panel for
Multidistrict Litigation. 68 Merrill Lynch quickly filed a motion to
dismiss Dabit's complaint as preempted by SLUSA. The Southern
District of New York ruled in April of 2003 that Dabit's complaint
fell "squarely within SLUSA's ambit" and dismissed the
69
complaint.
On appeal, the Second Circuit found that SLUSA did not
preempt claims that do not allege purchases or sales made by the
putative class members. 70 In its opinion, the Second Circuit
struggled with the issue of the appropriate interpretation of the
phrase "in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered
security." The court walked a tight line between the broad
construction of the phrase within Section 10(b) established by
Zandford and the narrow construction of the judicially-inferred
private right of action established in Blue Chip Stamps. The court
first announced its presumption that Congress intended the phrase
to have the same meaning in SLUSA as it has in Section 10(b). 7 '
After a careful analysis of the Blue Chip Stamps opinion, the court
then reasoned that the limitation on standing to bring a private suit
67. Id.
68. Id. at 29-30.
69. In re Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 02MDL1484(MP), 2003 WL 1872820
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
70. Dabit,395 F.3d at 28.
71. Id. at 35-36.
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under Section 10(b) is "unquestionably a distinct concept" from
the statutory and regulatory prohibition against fraud in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities. 72 However, the court
refused to reach the conclusion of its logic when it found that,
regardless of the recognition that the standing requirement is
independent of the statutory text, Congress meant to incorporate
the settled standing rule along with the "in connection with" phrase
since only purchasers and sellers have a federal private damages
remedy. 7 The court found that Dabit's complaint was preempted
by SLUSA because it contained implicit allegations of purchases
made by the putative class members. The Second Circuit directed
the lower courts to dismiss Dabit's complaint without prejudice,
allowing him to bring a new action that excluded allegations of
fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. The
court vacated the Southern District of New York's dismissal of
Dabit's lost commission claims.
B. The Majority Rule
Echoing the reasoning of the Second Circuit, those federal
circuits that have found in favor of excluding state securities
holding claims from the preemptive scope of SLUSA have done so
on the basis of two arguments. First, like the Second Circuit, these
circuits have relied on the presumption that Congress, in using the
words "in connection with" in both the 1934 Act and SLUSA,
intended for the words to have the same meaning in both
instances.74 Second, these circuits have found no Congressional
intent to broaden the reach of federal securities regulation beyond
closing the federal flight gap created after the passage of the
PSLRA of 1995.

72.
73.
74.

Id. at 39.
Id. at 40.
See Green v. Ameritrade, Inc., 279 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2002); Riley v.

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2002).
See also discussion infra Part III.B. 1.
75. See Dabit, 395 F.3d 25; Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 398
F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2005). See also discussion infra Part III.B.2.
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1. Presumptionof CongressionalKnowledge of Settled
JudicialInterpretation
The most commonly relied-upon argument in favor of finding
that SLUSA does not preempt state holding claims is that Congress
used the words "in connection with" with knowledge of their
settled judicial interpretation. This reasoning first appeared in the
Western District of Texas case Gutierrez v. Deloitte & Touche,
L.L.P. 76 The Gutierrez court presumed that Congress was aware of
the interpretation of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act which
incorporates the purchaser/seller rule adopted in Blue Chip
Stamps. 77 After making this presumption, the court reasoned that
Congress could have elected to expand the scope of SLUSA
beyond the limitation associated with the words "in connection
with" by providing that claims alleging misrepresentation in
connection with the failure to purchase or sell a security were also
removable to federal court.78 The court then held that SLUSA's
removal provision only applies to actions which allege
misrepresentations or omissions in connection with the purchase or
79
sale of a covered security.
The first federal circuit court to adopt similar reasoning was the
Eighth Circuit in 2002. 80 The court reasoned that, in enacting
SLUSA, Congress was aware of the settled judicial interpretation
of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.8 That judicial interpretation
established that state law was left to fill in the gaps left by federal
securities law, which did not recognize a cause of action for the
nonpurchase or nonsale of a security.82 In the same year, the
76. 147 F. Supp. 2d 584 (W.D. Tex. 2001). Although the Western District
of Texas is located within the federal Fifth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit has not
affirmatively spoken regarding this issue. The Gutierrez case was remanded to
the 224th Judicial District Court of Bexar County, Texas, for lack of federal
subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 595. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit did not have
an opportunity to address the issue raised in the district court.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Green v. Ameritrade, Inc., 279 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2002). This reasoning
has also been adopted by the Second Circuit. See Dabit,395 F.3d 25.
81. Green, 279 F.3d at 598.
82. Id.
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Eleventh Circuit also cited this presumption in recognizing that
SLUSA does not preempt state holding claims, although the court
also added that a claim is preempted by SLUSA when it sweeps
within its ambit actual purchases or sales of stock.83 In other
words, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that, although SLUSA
does not preempt state law holding claims, a plaintiff may not
merely plead around SLUSA's preemption provision.
2. No CongressionalIntent to Go Beyond Closing the Federal
FlightLoophole
Although there appears to be tension between Congress's
stated purpose in the passage of SLUSA and the incorporation of
the purchaser/seller standing rule through the words "in connection
with," some courts have determined that there exists no
contradiction between the two. The Second Circuit was the first
court to speak to this reasoning. 84 In Dabit, the court claimed that
there was no legislative history to support the conclusion that
Congress intended SLUSA to preempt claims that did not satisfy
the purchaser/seller standing rule of Blue Chip Stamps. Rather,
the court claimed that the statement of findings preceding the text
of SLUSA suggests that Congress intended to preempt only those
claims that had migrated from federal court into state court in order
to avoid the heightened pleading standards put into place by the
PSLRA. In other words, the court reasoned that Congress drafted
SLUSA to be no broader than necessary to prevent private state
securities class action suits from being used to frustrate the
purposes of the PSLRA.86 The Third Circuit employed a similar
rationale in 2005, explaining that Congress's use of the words "in
connection with" in SLUSA provided for the uniform application
constricting the
of federal fraud standards without expanding or
87
substantive reach of federal securities regulation.
83. Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334
(11 th Cir. 2002).
84. Dabit, 395 F.3d at 41.
85. Id.

86. Id.
87.

2005).

Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir.
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C. The Minority Rule
The Seventh Circuit is the only federal court of appeals to
adopt the opposite position in finding that SLUSA's preemption
88
provision does extend to state securities fraud holding claims.
The SEC has sided with this circuit's contrary view. 89 Arguments
supporting the minority view assert that Congress intended to
preempt such state causes of action in passing SLUSA, that the
policy considerations supporting the purchaser/seller standing rule
established in Blue Chip Stamps do not apply to the application of
SLUSA, and, most significantly, that SLUSA is a statute of
complete preemption, thus a legal duality between federal and state
private securities fraud90 claims involving nationally-traded
securities no longer exists.
1. CongressionalIntent to Go Beyond Closing the Federal
FlightLoophole
The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion written in 2005 by Judge
Easterbrook, held that, because SLUSA is as broad as Section
10(b) itself, the limitations imposed on private rights of action
under Section 10(b) do not open the door to litigation of securities
transactions under state laws. 91 The court reasoned that SLUSA is
designed to prevent plaintiffs from migrating to state court to
evade rules for federal securities litigation under the PSLRA.92
Because those rules included the Blue Chip Stamps standing
requirement, the court explained that interpreting SLUSA not to
preempt state securities fraud holding claims would be contrary to
88. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 403 F.3d 478 (7th Cir. 2005), vacated
on other grounds, 126 S. Ct. 2145 (2006).
89. Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 2005) (Nos. 03-7499 & 03-7458).
The Second Circuit requested the SEC's brief. Dabit, 395 F.3d at 34 n.6.
90. See Kircher, 403 F.3d 478. See also discussion infra Parts III.C.1-3.
91. Kircher, 403 F.3d at 484. The Seventh Circuit is careful to distinguish
between Section 10(b) enforcement actions and the use of Section 10(b) for
private actions. The court claims that the purchaser/seller standing rule does not
apply to SEC enforcement actions and it is in this sense that SLUSA is as broad
as Section 10(b) itself. Id. at 483.

92. Id. at 482.
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the stated purpose of SLUSA. The court noted the distinction
between the use of Section 10(b) for SEC enforcement actions, in
which a broad construction of the phrase "in connection with" is
employed, 93 and the use of Section 10(b) for private rights of
action, in which the narrow purchaser/seller rule is applied to
plaintiffs as established under Blue Chip Stamps.94 The court
found that because the narrow purchaser/seller standing rule is not
required by the language of Section 10(b), the broad interpretation
of the phrase "in connection with the purchase or sale" of a
security should be applied to the construction of SLUSA's
preemption provision. 95 The court reasoned that it would be ironic
that a Supreme Court decision 96 intended to limit private litigation
by non-traders would become the springboard from which that
very litigation could be pursued under state law, despite
Congress's contrary view that all
securities fraud class actions
97
should proceed under federal law.
Advocates of the minority rule also argue that it is not
deleterious to their position that there is no mention in the
Congressional record of a Congressional intent to preempt state
securities holding claims.
Congressional reports from the
committees that participated in the drafting of SLUSA can be read
to find intent to preempt devices not considered specifically at that
time, but which would also have the effect of undermining the
PSLRA. 98 A report issued by the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs states that, although the committee felt
it had successfully reached all actions that could be used to
circumvent the PSLRA, SLUSA should be interpreted broadly to
reach actions and other procedural devices that could be used to
get around the class action definition. 99 Proponents of the minority
view cite this statement as evidence of a Congressional intent that

93. See, e.g., SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002); United States v.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
94. Kircher, 403 F.3d at 483.
95. Id.
96. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
97. Kircher, 403 F.3d at 484.
98. Ratner, supra note 35, at 1049.
99. Id.
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SLUSA be construed in a way to ensure that the protections of the
100
PSLRA were enforced in practice.
2. Policy ConsiderationsSupporting.Preemption
In an amicus brief to the Second Circuit, the SEC cited policy
considerations as one of the reasons to find that SLUSA's
preemption provision should extend to state law holding claims.
The SEC argued that the purchaser/seller standing rule was
designed as a limitation to judicially-inferred private rights of
action under Section 10(b) in order to eliminate vexatious lawsuits
characterized by difficult issues of proof. 1 1 However, the SEC
argued that if the same limitation were applied to SLUSA, it would
produce the opposite effect from that intended by Congress,
allowing suits with precisely the same undesirable characteristics
to go forward. 10 2 Essentially, the SEC argued to the Second
Circuit that the words "in connection with" as used in SLUSA
should not be interpreted in the same way as they have been
regarding a private right of action because the relevant policy
considerations supporting the purchaser/seller rule are not present
in SLUSA.
Conversely, the SEC argued that the broad
interpretation of "in connection with" established in Zandford
10 3
should be applied to the construction of the phrase in SLUSA.
The Second Circuit did not accept this argument.'04
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit cited other policy concerns in
its opinion in Kircher. The court argued that since private causes
of action under Section 10(b) are judicially created, the courts are
the ultimate arbiters of defining the scope of the purchaser/seller
standing rule incorporated through the words "in connection
with."' 05 Section 10(b), as originally intended, creates a federal
regulatory standard, permitting the SEC to enforce the prohibition
100. Id.
101. Brief for the SEC, supra note 88, at 20.
102. Id.
103. Id.at 21.
104. Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d 25, 36
(2d Cir. 2005), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 1503 (2006).
105. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 403 F.3d 478, 483 (7th Cir. 2005),
vacated on other grounds, 126 S. Ct. 2145 (2006).
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through administrative proceedings.10 6 The Supreme Court in Blue
Chip Stamps chose to limit the judicially-inferred private right of
action under Section 10(b) in an effort to confine such actions to
situations where litigation is apt to do more good than harm.0 7
Therefore, the Court reasoned that federal courts retain the
authority to interpret the words "in connection with" in the context
of a private right of action under Section 10(b), and should do so in
a manner that will be socially productive without having that
interpretation apply in other contexts.
3. Complete Preemption of State Securities FraudClass
Actions
The most compelling argument in support of the minority rule
is that SLUSA is a statute of complete preemption, meaning that
Congress succeeded in transforming every class action securities
fraud claim involving a nationally-traded security into a federal
claim. Such a conclusion reached by a court carries significant
weight as it alters the general rules of pleading. The complete
preemption doctrine is an exception to the well-pleaded complaint
rule, which prohibits a court from reading into the plaintiffs
complaint in order to discern the true nature of the plaintiffs
claim. i 08The well-pleaded complaint rule makes the plaintiff the
master of his complaint-he or she may plead around a federal
0 9
statute so as to avoid invoking federal question jurisdiction.'
Furthermore, a defendant may not remove to federal court
asserting federal question jurisdiction on the basis that a federal
question is likely to be raised in the defense."l 0 Accordingly, a
plaintiff may avoid removal by omitting federal claims.'
However, general pleading rules do not apply if a completely
preemptive federal statute is invoked. Under the complete
preemption doctrine, the preemptive force of a federal statute may
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. O'Hare, supra note 42, at 344. See also Behlen v. Merrill Lynch, 311
F.3d 1087, 1090 (11th Cir. 2002).
109. O'Hare, supra note 42, at 344.
110. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
111. Id.
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be so extraordinary that a state common law complaint is
converted into a federal claim.'12 Under this rationale, a state
common law claim falling within the scope of a statute of complete
preemption is necessarily federal in character, and a defendant may
remove the claim to federal
court under the general removal
3
1441.11
§
U.S.C.
28
statute,
The SEC strongly advocated this argument to the Second
Circuit as amicus curiae, claiming that SLUSA intentionally
altered the federal-state relationship by preempting all state
securities fraud claims. 1 4 The SEC encouraged the Second Circuit
to recognize that the effect of SLUSA was to make any claim
within SLUSA's preemptive scope completely federal in nature.
The ultimate outcome of such a finding would be dismissal of the
complaint if the action had been brought only under a state law
theory of fraudulent inducement." 5 This argument ultimately won
the day in the Second Circuit, although the court declined to take it
as far as the SEC would have liked. The Second Circuit
acknowledged that "Congress could not have spoken more clearly"
regarding its intent to completely preempt the field of certain types
of state securities class action suits. 116 The court's limitation of

certain types of class action suits referred to other substantive
limitations within SLUSA, including the purchaser/seller standing
rule incorporated through the words "in connection with." The
court then reasoned that this finding leads to the conclusion that
Congress's complete preemption of these certain types of securities
fraud claims provides an exception to the well-pleaded complaint
rule such that "the plaintiff has necessarily invoked federal
question jurisdiction, even though he [or she] did not wish to
'
[sic].' 17

112. O'Hare, supra note 42, at 345.
113. Id.at346.
114. Brief for the SEC, supranote 88, at 7.
115. Id. at 8. The action would be removed to federal court under SLUSA's
removal provision, where it would be dismissed under SLUSA's preemption
provision for failure to state a claim.
116. Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d 25, 3334 (2d Cir. 2005), vacated, 126 S.Ct. 1503 (2006).
117. Id.
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The Seventh Circuit followed similar reasoning when it held
that the plaintiffs' common law holding claims in Kircher were
actually disguised Section 10(b) claims that should have been
brought in federal court." 8 Although the Seventh Circuit did not
specifically find that SLUSA was a statute of complete
preemption, the court, in practice, applied the complete preemption
exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule by reading between
the lines of the plaintiffs' petition to find grounds for dismissal." 19
The court reasoned that the plaintiffs' claims depended on
statements made or omitted in connection with their own purchase
of securities. 120 Therefore, the plaintiffs' effort to define a nonpurchaser and non-seller class was designed to evade the PSLRA
in order to litigate a securities class action suit in state court with
the intent of winning an idiosyncratic award from a local judge or
jury. 12 1 The court further commented that the plaintiff class's
perceived evasion of PSLRA standards was the very sort of
maneuver that SLUSA was designed to prevent. 122 This argument
has been24accepted by the Third Circuit' 2 and tacitly by the Eighth
Circuit.
IV. THE DEATH OF THE STATE SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTION
LAWSUIT

The Supreme Court of the United States heard oral arguments
in Dabit's case on January 18, 2006, and returned its unanimous
decision on March 21, 2006.125 The Court adopted the Seventh
Circuit's broad interpretation of SLUSA's preemptive scope by
118. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 403 F.3d 478, 484 (7th Cir. 2005),
vacated on other grounds, 126 S. Ct. 2145 (2006).
119. Id. The court stated that the plaintiffs could have brought their claims in
federal court directly under Section 10(b) and Rule I 0b-5. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 398 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2005).
124. Dudek v. Prudential Securities, 295 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2002). See also
Prof'l Mgmt. Assocs., Inc. Employees' Profit Sharing Plan v. KPMG, 335 F.3d
800 (8th Cir. 2003).
125. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503
(2006).
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finding that claims brought by holders of securities alleging the
fraudulent manipulation of stock prices are preempted along with
126
claims brought by purchasers and sellers of securities.
However, in doing so, the Court left the questions regarding
whether SLUSA represents Congress's complete preemption of
securities fraud class action suits and the SEC's enforcement
authority in preempted cases unanswered.
A. The Dabit Opinion
In agreeing with the Seventh Circuit's construction of
SLUSA's preemption provision, the Court found that Congress had
intended the phrase "in connection with the purchase or sale" of a
security to incorporate the broad construction of the phrase
developed under Zandford, not the purchaser/seller standing
limitation created in Blue Chip Stamps. The Court also looked to
policy considerations, including the PSLRA's ultimate goal of
eliminating vexatious suits, which supported its construction of
SLUSA's preemption provision.
1. Presumptionof CongressionalKnowledge of Settled
JudicialInterpretation
The Court began by clearly stating that the Blue Chip Stamps
purchaser/seller standing limitation is not required from the text of
Section 10(b) or Rule lOb-5. It stated that the Blue Chip Stamps
Court relied chiefly on policy considerations, rather than the text of
the statute, in advocating the limitation. 27 Furthermore, the Court
reasoned that the Blue Chip Stamps decision addressed exclusively
the scope of the private right of action, not the construction of the
words "in connection with the purchase or sale" found in Rule
28
lOb-5.1
The Court also relied on the presumption of Congressional
knowledge of settled judicial interpretation. It stated that this
126. Id. at 1507.
127. Id. at 1512. This is unlike the purchaser/seller standing limitation
established in the Birnbaum decision, which relied on the language of Rule 1Ob5. Id.
128. Id.
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presumption is particularly required in the case of SLUSA's
preemptive provision since Congress used the exact same language
found in Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 in a provision that appears
in the same statute as Section 10(b). 129 However, the Court
departed from the Second Circuit's reasoning by finding that
Congress intended to incorporate the broad construction of the
phrase established in Zandford and O'Hagan rather than the
purchaser/seller standing limitation established in Blue Chip
Stamps. The Court reasoned that when it has construed the scope
of Section 10(b) in its jurisprudence, it has sought to give it a broad
interpretation. 13
This broad interpretation under its precedent
established that it is enough for the plaintiff to allege that the fraud
"coincided" with any securities transaction, made by either the
plaintiff or another party. 13 1 The Court held that the language of
Section 10(b), and therefore the language of SLUSA, required only
fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security," not
32
fraud perpetrated on an identifiable purchaser or seller.'
2. Policy Considerations
The greatest policy concern cited by the Court was the
intention of Congress in passing SLUSA. The Court reasoned that
a narrow reading of the statute could not be reconciled with
SLUSA's stated purpose and would frustrate the effectiveness of
the 1995 PSLRA.' 13
Furthermore, the Court stated that the
question of whether or not a complaint alleges fraud "in connection
with the purchase or sale" of securities was not to be determined
by the identity of the plaintiffs. 134 This portion of the Court's
opinion echoed similar concerns posed by the SEC's amicus brief
to the Second Circuit.135 Additionally, the Court looked to similar

129. Id. at 1513.
130. Id.

131. Id. (citing SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002); United States v.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Banker's Life
& Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971)).

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1515.
135. See Brief for the SEC, supra note 88, at 20.
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policy concerns it had recognized in Blue Chip Stamps. The Court
warned that the construction of SLUSA proposed by Dabit would
give rise to wasteful, duplicative litigation since those facts
supporting an action by purchasers under Rule 1Ob-5 in federal
court generally also support an action brought by holders in state
court. 136 The Court expressed concern regarding the potential of
parallel class actions proceeding in state and federal court with
137
different standards governing their respective outcomes.
The Court also recognized a strong federal interest in
protecting the efficient operation of the market for nationallytraded securities.138 After examining this strong federal interest,
the Court could not identify a competing state interest. It
recognized that the effect of SLUSA is only to deny plaintiffs the
right to bring a class action suit to vindicate certain claims.
Individual plaintiffs and groups of fewer than fifty plaintiffs retain
the right to enforce any existing state-law cause of action under
SLUSA. 13 9 Furthermore, the Court stated that the parties could
only identify one pre-SLUSA case involving a state securities
fraud holding class action suit, although such suits were
theoretically permissible both before and after Blue Chip
Stamps. 14° Hence, the Court concluded that Congress had not
eliminated1 a historically entrenched state-law remedy in passing
SLUSA.

14

B. SLUSA and Complete Preemption

The Court did not address the question of whether SLUSA
should be interpreted to be a statute of complete preemption, an
142
issue to which the Seventh Circuit responded affirmatively.
Nevertheless, SLUSA should be interpreted to be a statute of
136.

Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct. at 1514.

137. Id.
138. Id. at 1509.
139. Id. at 1514.
140. Id. (citing Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1982)).
141. Id.
142. See Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 403 F.3d 478, 484 (7th Cir. 2005),
vacated on other grounds, 126 S. Ct. 2145 (2006) (applying the complete
preemption exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule in practice by reading
between the lines of the plaintiffs petition to find grounds for dismissal).

2006]

NOTES

complete preemption since the language of the statute suggests that
Congress intended for federal law to provide the exclusive remedy
for securities fraud class actions involving nationally-traded
securities.
Furthermore, Congress's inclusion of a specific
removal right is not dispositive of a finding that SLUSA is a statute
of complete preemption. The proper inquiry to be applied in
determining whether a statute is intended to completely preempt
state causes of action is whether Congress intended for the statute
to provide the exclusive cause of action for the injury. 14 3 If the
circumstances surrounding the statute support such a finding, then
the complete preemption doctrine applies and the action may be
removed to federal court under Section 1441.144 Therefore, the
doctrine of complete preemption requires that Congress both
completely preempt an area of the law such that any civil
complaint within the law's scope is necessarily federal in character
and intend for the federal statute to provide the exclusive cause of
action.
The statement of findings that precedes SLUSA in conjunction
with specific exclusions for state causes of action within SLUSA
suggests that Congress intended to establish federal securities law
as the exclusive remedy for securities fraud class action suits
involving nationally-traded securities. Congress found that it was
necessary to establish national standards for securities class action
lawsuits involving nationally-traded securities. 145 Also, SLUSA
expressly excludes shareholder derivative suits, 146 as well as a
class of claims for the breach of state-imposed fiduciary duties
referred to as the "Delaware Carve-Outs." 1 In view of the legal
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius,148 it may be inferred
that Congress did intend to provide the exclusive remedy for
securities fraud class action suits involving nationally-traded
143. O'Hare, supra note 42, at 346-47 (citing Beneficial Nat'l Bank v.
Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 9 n.5 (2003)).
144. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2004).
145. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105353, § 2, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a (2005)).
146. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2)(B) (2005).
147. Id. § 77p(d)(1). See also Berne & Friel, supra note 60.
148. The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1717 (8th ed. 2004).
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securities and that Congress, therefore, did preempt all nonexcluded state securities fraud class action suits, including
defrauded holder claims.
Those opposing complete preemption argue that Congress's
149
inclusion of a specific removal provision within SLUSA
suggests that it did not intend for SLUSA to completely preempt
all state securities fraud class action suits. In effect, the doctrine of
complete preemption is a removal doctrine, because once a statute
is recognized to be completely preemptive, a claim under state law
automatically becomes a federal claim removable to federal court
under the general removal statute. Consequently, the complete
preemption doctrine is unnecessary to remove an action under the
general removal statute if a statute exists containing a specialized
removal provision.' 50 The problem with this reasoning, however,
is that Congress's decision to include a removal provision within
SLUSA is not dispositive of a finding that SLUSA is a statute of
Viewed from another perspective,
complete preemption.
Congress's choice to include a removal provision within SLUSA is
indicative of its intent to ensure a specific removal right for class
action suits falling within SLUSA's preemptive scope.
C. CollateralImpact on the SEC
In addition to the question regarding complete preemption, the
issue of SLUSA's collateral impact on the SEC's enforcement
authority also remains unanswered. There is no doubt that SLUSA
does not directly impact the SEC's enforcement authority since it
was drafted to affect only private class action suits brought for
However, how is the SEC's enforcement
securities fraud.
authority impacted after a court determines that a certain class
action complaint is not preempted by SLUSA? The United States
Supreme Court has made it clear that SLUSA incorporates the
broad construction of the phrase "in connection with the purchase
or sale" of a security-the construction that applies to the SEC's
enforcement of Section 10(b) violations. Therefore, in order for a
court to determine whether SLUSA preempts a particular claim,
149.
150.

15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) (2005).
O'Hare, supra note 42, at 371.
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that court must necessarily determine whether the SEC has
enforcement authority in the matter. Because all non-exempted
claims falling within the language of SLUSA would be preempted,
a conclusion that a private claim was not preempted would be
tantamount to a conclusion that the conduct involved fell outside of
the SEC's authority to enforce Section 10(b).
This reasoning was presented to the Court during oral
argument of the Dabit case by Dabit's counsel. Justice Stevens,
the author of the Dabit opinion, responded to the argument with
the conclusion that the SEC would not be bound by a district
court's decision in a private suit and would be frec Lo relitigate the
matter. 15 1 However, the Court's opinion belies such an easy
conclusion since it reasons that facts supporting an action by
holders typically also will support an action by purchasers under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5."'2 Therefore, even though the SEC
may not be bound by a district court's determination of whether
the complaint satisfies the "in connection with the purchase or
sale" requirement, the district court's determination still stands as
persuasive authority against the SEC's enforcement power.
V. CONCLUSION

Congress was deliberate in altering the duality between federal
and state regulation of nationally-traded securities when it enacted
SLUSA. In the MerrillLynch v. Dabit opinion, the Supreme Court
settled a dispute among the federal appellate circuits and affirmed
Congress's position by holding that SLUSA preempts state
securities fraud holding claims in addition to claims brought by
purchasers and sellers. This interpretation eliminates the risk of
wasteful, competing litigation in state and federal courts.
Additionally, such a construction of SLUSA comports with the
encompassing policy goal of all federal securities regulation-to
promote an efficient and honest market for all nationally-traded
securities.
However, the Court's opinion does not answer
questions regarding complete preemption and the collateral impact
151. Transcript of Oral Argument at 51-52, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503 (2006) (No. 04-1371).
152. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503,
1514 (2006).
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of the Court's interpretation on the SEC's enforcement authority.
Therefore, even though the state securities fraud class action suit
may be dead, questions surrounding the interpretation and
application of SLUSA will continue to be litigated in federal
courts.
Melanie P. Goolsby*
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